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The Changing Returns to Education: An 
Analysis of the Returns to Education as they 
Change from 2002 to 2012 in 5 Countries
Jonas Wightman
Abstract
 Education is widely understood to impact 
earnings, but the dynamics of this relationship – 
specifically, the returns to education – are important 
to consider in depth. Through a synthesis of human 
capital theory and the Paradox of Progress, which 
relates income ine-quality to educational attain-
ment, I explore how the returns to education have 
changed over time. I use 2002 and 2012 International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) income and educa-
tion data to first determine the returns to education 
within the United States, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, 
and Sweden with OLS regressions and then to com-
paratively analyze how the measure changed from 
one year to the next in each country. I find that there 
is not a consistent pattern of change across the entire 
panel of countries, which sug-gests that the Paradox 
of Progress might not be universally pertinent.
I. Introduction
 Education is widely understood to impact 
earnings. But the dynamics of this relationship – spe-
cifically, the degree to which education leads to high-
er income later in life – are important to consider in 
depth. An understanding of this phenomenon in-
forms individuals’ decisions regarding the pursuit of 
educational attainment; is one more year of schooling 
worth the time it detracts from other pursuits – say, 
entering the labor force? It is an important decision 
and, while there are many other elements to consider 
when making it, an understanding of the returns to 
education can prove instrumental.
But these returns change over time; the relative value 
of education today is not the same as it was ten years 
ago. And so a measure of education’s contempora-
neous impacts does not provide insight into how 
the benefits of schooling change as time progresses. 
This essay considers these dynamics by examining the 
returns to education within a panel of countries at two 
points in time – in 2002 and in 2012 – and comparing 
them. Through this analysis, we can track changes in 
the value of education over time and, by the nature of 
this particular approach, across countries.
 In Section II, I provide an overview of hu-
man capital theory and a commentary on the findings 
of François Bourguignon, Francisco H. C. Ferreira, 
and Nora Lustig (2005) as they pertain to the value 
of education. I then consolidate the foundations and 
conclusions of this theory and these findings to pres-
ent the hypothesis that the value of education will rise 
over time. Section III discusses the datasets with which 
I assess the returns to education, the processes through 
which I made these data effective, and the models I 
use to determine the returns to education. Section IV 
analyzes the results from the models provided in Sec-
tion III and Section V speaks to their findings and the 
impli-cations we can pull from them.
II. Theory & Literature
A. Human Capital Theory
 While the concepts it seeks to address have 
been present in economic schools of thought for quite 
some time, human capital theory has only existed in the 
capacity it does now for about three decades (Rosen, 
2008). It is an outgrowth of capital theory, which seeks 
to explain the allocation and both the short-term and 
long-term effects that investment in resources yield 
(Bliss, 2005). In human capital theory, this invest-
ment in re-sources takes shape through education and 
training (Becker, 1964). The theory expresses that, over 
their life cycle, individuals can develop their skills and 
earning capacity. As such, it effectively explains how 
self-investment can lead to higher levels of short-term 
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Blinder decomposition method to consider more 
intimately the causal effects of various changes 
within these countries. Bourguignon, Ferreira, 
and Lustig use the technique to explore income 
inequality at a national scale; its implementation is 
similar in nature to the labor-market applications 
for which it was developed and initially used, but 
repurposed for a macroeconomic analysis of over-
all income inequality and the effects of a slightly 
broader variety of indicators – most importantly 
for the purposes of this paper: education levels .
 One of Bourguignon, Ferriera, and Lustig’s 
primary focuses related to the levels of educational 
attainment in these countries. Unsurprisingly, aver-
age levels of education rose in all seven countries; 
but the dynamics of this change were unexpected. 
One might think that developing countries, in par-
ticular, would experience larger rises in educational 
attainment among the younger members of society 
and thus a widening of the educational attainment 
gap between younger working-age individuals and 
older working-age individuals. This would reflect 
the widely popularized developmental pattern pre-
sented by Simon Kuznets (Kuznets, 1955).
But, while I expect this pattern might still hold 
in more undeveloped parts of the world, Bour-
guignon, Ferreira, and Lustig did away with this 
concept within their study by noting that:
“In actual fact, the distribution of schooling levels 
in the population at working age became more 
equal in all seven countries. The difference across 
countries in the effect of more education on in-
equality must, therefore, lie in the mechanism of 
transmission from education to household in-
comes, rather than the dynamics of the distribution 
of years of schooling itself.”
(Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Lustig, 2005, p. 394)
And so we see that a country’s stage of develop-
ment does not signal any particularly relevant de-
tails about the distribution of education within its 
borders. Levels of educational attainment equalized 
across the board.
 In Subsection A of this section, we estab-
lished that earnings were tightly tied to an individ-
ual’s education. Here, we see that educational levels 
became more similar across the population. Ceteris 
paribus, we would expect these two premises, in 
conjunction, to reduce income inequality – indi-
earnings and long-term wealth.
Becker addresses on-the-job training and various other 
methods of gaining knowledge, but most of the theory 
– and this essay – focuses on education. In this con-
text, human capital theory suggests positive returns to 
education. This is not disputed. It is very widely accept-
ed that increases to education lead to higher levels of 
income , though there is some debate over the dynam-
ics of this relationship. Signalling theory, for instance, 
suggests that individuals do not obtain education to de-
velop their human capital but rather to signal a variety 
of desirable traits–discipline, drive, intelligence, and the 
ability to learn, to name a few–to potential employers.
 Both of these theories correlate higher levels 
of education with higher levels of wealth, but human 
capital theory presents education as the cause of this 
positive correla-tion. This essay will explore the rela-
tionship that education has with income. By placing 
this conversation within human capital theory, we can 
discuss changes in the education-income correlation in 
terms of returns to education.
B. Education & Income Inequality
 François Bourguignon, Francisco H. C. Fer-
reira, and Nora Lustig (2005) edited a book titled The 
Microeconomics of Income Distribution Dynamics 
in East Asia and Latin America in which they attempt 
to explore the changes in the distribution of income 
during periods of economic development; their inten-
tion with this book is not to propose a universal theory 
on income distribution or development but rather to 
show that there is an incredible amount of diversity 
in the developmental processes of different countries. 
They approach this topic with a somewhat narrowed 
lens, focusing on seven countries within East Asia and 
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Taiwan.
 The time periods in each of these countries that 
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig examined were not 
consistent in length–their analysis of Brazil included 
data spanning a 20 year period while the Colombian 
data ranges only 7 years–but all seven case studies cov-
er periods ending in the mid to late 1990’s. The incon-
sistency in duration is obviously undesirable, but the 
bulk of their analysis only considers the beginning and 
end of the sampled period, which produces less incon-
sistency than if they considered shorter-term changes 
within the countries with larger sample periods.
 They use a generalized form of the Oaxaca-
33The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIV
Wightman
viduals across the country are obtaining more similar 
levels education and thus should obtain more similar 
levels of income.  But this is not what we see.
 Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig’s analy-
sis revealed that income inequality actually rose in 
nearly all of the countries in question. They present 
a concept they label ‘The Paradox of Progress’ to 
discuss this. Generally, increases in educational at-
tainment and decreases in inequality are both viewed 
as signs of progress. But the Paradox of Progress 
suggests that these do not go hand-in-hand; instead, 
increases in educational attainment actually cause 
higher levels of income inequality.
 Their analysis identifies that the education-
inequality relationship is rooted in how education 
translates into earnings rather than how education 
is distributed across the population. More than this, 
they do not comment on the causes for the Paradox 
of Progress. I suggest that the cause relates to the 
returns to education.
 Gasparini, Marchionni, and Escudero (2005) 
conclude after a regression analysis of wage-edu-
cation profiles in Argentina that, “[in] summary, 
the changes in the returns to education appear to 
have been mildly inequality reducing between 1986 
and 1992 and strongly inequality increasing in the 
next six years.” (p. 56) This is a simple, yet profound 
finding: the returns to education impacted income 
inequality to varying degrees at different points in 
time.
 The role of education actually changed 
enough between these two periods to have a drasti-
cally different effect. And if the effect of education 
on income inequality changes while the distribution 
of schooling becomes more uniform, the value of 
education must be changing. This takes Bourgui-
gnon, Ferreira, and Lustig’s conclusions regarding the 
relevance of the mechanisms of transmission from 
education to earnings and suggests that the returns 
to education might be a primary cause for the Para-
dox of Progress.
 In this essay, I examine the impacts of educa-
tion as they change over time. If these returns rise 
consistently, it suggests that increasing returns to 
education are a primary cause for the Paradox of 
Progress. And so, I hypothesize that the returns to 
education increase over time.
III. Empirical Model
 To explore this relationship, I use data from 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a 
program co-founded in 1984 through the collabora-
tive efforts of various universities and research institu-
tions to develop data that is internationally compara-
ble and targeted at particular areas of focus. These 
data are collected independently by various entities 
associated with ISSP and compiled by the Zentralar-
chiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of 
Cologne in collaboration with the Analisis Sociologi-
cos, Economicos y Politicos in Spain. The questions 
and topics are originally written in English and devel-
oped in a manner so as to be relevant in all countries 
involved.
 ISSP conducts a variety of surveys focused on 
different topics; one of its more unique traits is the 
fact that the same sorts of surveys are conducted pe-
riodically. The particular data I use here are from the 
Family and Changing Gender Roles Surveys of 2002 
and 2012. I focus on five countries: the United States, 
Germany , Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. The surveys 
in each of these countries gathered data on over 900 
subjects. 
 The ISSP provides comprehensive survey data 
– the topic-relevant survey ques-tions are generated 
and translated collaboratively across the involved 
countries, so this information is consistent and rela-
tively straightforward. But much of the other relevant 
data – particularly measures of income – are not 
normalized across the different countries. This infor-
mation is gathered in local currency units and is often 
measured on varying scales; for instance, data collec-
tors in the United States ask respondents for annual 
income while those in European countries are usually 
interested in monthly earnings. Further, while most 
surveys ask for post-tax income, some are concerned 
with respondent earnings prior to tax payments. This 
is particularly problematic in Europe, where many 
countries implement social-democratic welfare re-
gimes.
 I normalized these data into annual terms 
and into 2010 USD using the Official Exchange Rate 
and Consumer Price Index measures from The World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators to convert local 
currencies to USD and then to adjust for inflation. The 
ISSP codebooks provided information on the various 
questions asked in each country; I used these to iden-
tify those countries which gathered monthly data and 
multiplied their earnings data by a factor of twelve 
to convert them into annual measures. Sweden, in 
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2012, asked respondents for before-tax income; they 
implement a flat tax at 56% across the population, so I 
simply adjusted their normalized data accordingly.
 With the income data consistent, I present two 
regression models with which to interpret these data:
1. LN_NORMINC = α + ß1 (GERMANY) + ß2 
(POLAND) + ß3 (SLOVENIA) + ß4 (SWEDEN)
2. LN_NORMINC = α + ß1 (GERMANY) + ß2 
(POLAND) + ß3 (SLOVENIA) + ß4 (SWEDEN) + ß5 
(EDUCATION) + ß6 (GE_EDU) + ß7 (PL_EDU) + 
ß8 (SL_EDU) + ß9 (SW_EDU)
 I created dummy variables for each of the five 
countries which allows us to select and isolate particu-
lar countries relative to the United States in each of 
the regression models. Model 2 introduces interaction 
variables as well, to address the impacts of education 
on each of these countries individually. Table 1 
explains these variables.
 I use the natural logarithm of income rather 
than the normalized measure of actual income as 
the dependent variable here because income tends 
to be non-linearly distributed. By taking the natural 
logarithm, I effectively linearize the distribution of 
income; this allows for a more accurate regression 
analysis without having to implement a different type 
of regression.
 Model 1 expresses the average levels of income 
in each country, relative to the United States. This 
does not provide much insight – certainly nothing 
that we could not gather through other means – but 
lays the groundwork for the second regression. The 
coefficients in Model 2, on the other hand, allow us to 
calculate the degree to which education impacts these 
differences in income, relative to the United States. 
With these we can compare the returns to education 
in each of the five countries.
 Further, running this regression in two years 
expands the capacity of these models’ analytical 
power. By comparing the results from both 2002 and 
2012 side by side, we can view the relative changes in 
education’s effects over time and derive the changes in 
the returns to education in each of these countries. As 
per the conversation in Section II, I hypothesize that 
these returns rise from 2002 to 2012.
IV. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics & Model 1 Regression Results
 As these data were conducted through sur-
veys, not all individuals provided data for all fields. In 
the case of this analysis, I excluded any education data 
that did not fall in line with the continuous measure 
I use here. I also excluded individuals that did not 
provide income data. There were surveys in which the 
highest option for reporting income read something 
along the lines of ‘900,000 LCU and above.’ In these 
cases, I recoded the values so that the lower bound 
registered as the respondent’s income. After control-
ling for gaps in relevant data, the sample sizes for each 
country fell. Table 2 shows the numbers of relevant 
respondents in each country after adjusting for these 
missing values.
 Poland is the only country in which the 
sample sizes fell by particularly large margins with 
these controls, dropping by about 60% in both years. 
As such, it is also the country with the smallest sample 
pool. However, all of these countries still have enough 
samples to be considered relevant for this analysis.
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 Table 2 also shows average income and average 
educational attainment in each of the five countries. 
These measures can be calculated through the appli-
cation of Model 1 and Model 2 (presented in Section 
III), but Table 2’s data were collected through descrip-
tive statistical methods. It is important to note here 
that average education rose in each of these coun-
tries – considerably more so in Germany and Poland, 
where average educational attainment rose by over 
one year.
 An application of Model 1 (see Table 3) yield-
ed income measures that consistently scored within 
$4 of those obtained through descriptive statistics. In 
all but the two richest countries here, average income 
rose from one period to the next. This reduction in 
earnings within the United States and Sweden likely 
relates to the changes in wage distribution resulting 
from the financial crisis in the late 2000’s. There exists 
evidence suggesting that income levels in the United 
States have stagnated through the 21st century to 
this point (Mischel & Davis, 2015) – for instance, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis suggests that levels 
of household income in 2012 are actually lower than 
they were in 2002 (St. Louis Fed).
 The most drastic change, however, was in 
Poland where average income nearly doubled over the 
course of the decade. During the global financial cri-
sis, Poland experienced surprisingly negligible change 
in unemployment – it actually fell slightly between 
2007 and 2009. Further, its GDP expanded dramati-
cally, growing by nearly 6% in the same period (Am-
able & Ken, 2011) This is partly because it adopted the 
concept of the short-time work scheme from coun-
tries like Germany, Austria, and Japan, which effec-
tively limited the number of workers who were laid 
off as a result of the economic recession.
 But Poland’s economic policy as a whole 
also differed from that of other OECD countries. 
For example, unlike several other European states, 
its currency was not tethered to the Euro. Countries 
with strong currencies on the world market (IE: US 
Dollars, Euros, etc.) and those countries who tied 
their currencies to said strong currencies seemed 
to experience much harsher recessionary effects.  
Poland, in having complete control over its currency, 
was able to respond more effectively to the recession 
(Klein, 2012). This lack of tethering also allowed 
Poland to keep its debt relatively low prior to and 
throughout the financial crisis (Pleitgen, 2010).
 Also important to note is that Poland, Slove-
nia, and East Germany were part of the Communist 
bloc up until just before the 1990’s. The first several 
years of economic transition from controlled sys-
tems to more laissez-faire economies saw dramatic 
reductions in overall economic output throughout 
the eastern bloc (European Commission, 2014); in 
this period, things like union membership shifted 
from being compulsory to being entirely optional 
(Visser, 2006). Thus they experienced extreme 
exchange rate volatility and large changes in CPI 
(World Development Indicators). This instability 
through much of the 1990’s justifies the relatively 
low income levels in each of these countries (and the 
surprisingly low average income measures within 
Germany, since half of the economy was transition-
ing). Most of these countries recovered extremely 
well through the later 1990’s to the onset of the glob-
al financial crisis (Carter, 2007). But the large-scale 
changes occurring from the mid 1990’s through to 
2012 are very likely reflected in these data – so, both 
the low levels of income and the high degrees of 
change from one period to the next can be accepted.
B. Model 2 Regression Results
 The findings on which we must primarily fo-
cus, however, stem from Model 2’s results, presented 
in Table 4. Here, the first four variables are applied in 
the same way as in Model 1, the difference being that 
they no longer provide a measure of average income. 
Instead, α, GERMANY, POLAND, SLOVENIA, and 
SWEDEN refer to only the non-educational compo-
nents of respondents’ income.
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 To examine the returns to education, we 
must consider the final five variables presented. 
Taken while all dummy and interaction variables 
equal zero, EDUCATION provides us the returns to 
education within the United States; by multiplying 
ß6 by a given level of education – say, 12 years – and 
adding that to the constant, we can calculate the ex-
pected earnings of an individual in the United States 
with 12 years of education.
 The same idea applies for the other countries 
when their respective dummy variables and inter-
action terms are triggered. In this case, rather than 
simply combining α and ß6, we must – say, for the 
case of Germany – include α, ß1, ß6, and ß7. Exam-
ining ß7 on its own tells us how Germany’s returns 
to education compare to those of the United States; 
ß6 and ß7 taken in tandem reflect the returns to
education in Germany in an abso-lute sense.
 But we are not concerned with the full power 
of this model. Instead of focusing on the actual 
earnings individuals are expected to obtain, we will 
examine the changes in the returns to education – as 
measured by the coefficients attached to EDUCA-
TION, GE_EDU, PL_EDU, SL_EDU, and SW_EDU. 
Table 4 presents these returns as they fall relative to 
the United States’ returns to education.
Table 5 presents each country’s returns to education 
in an absolute sense.
 It is important to note that, in Table 5, the 
interaction variables for GE_EDU and PL_EDU 
were insignificant in 2002. The country dummy 
variable for both GERMANY in 2002 and SLOVE-
NIA in 2012 were also insignificant. But none of 
this affects the ap-plicability of the model. Since we 
are only focused on the returns to education, we are 
not interested in calculating expected income; thus 
the insignificance of GERMANY and SLOVENIA is 
irrelevant. More importantly, the insignificance of 
GE_EDU and PL_EDU does not render our model 
useless for these two countries either. The irrele-
vance of these interaction terms merely means that 
the returns to education in Germany and Poland 
were not significantly different from those in the 
United States. And so, in calculating the values pre-
sented in Table 5, we simply replace the coefficient 
values in for GE_EDU and PL_EDU with zero, effec-
tively setting them equal to the returns in the United 
States.
 Table 5 shows us that the returns to educa-
tion rose in the United States, Slovenia, and Sweden
and that these returns fell in both Germany and Po-
land. The growth in returns was largest in the United 
States, increasing by 4.5%. They grew by only half 
as much in Slovenia, rising 2.3% over the decade in 
question, and less than a third as much in Sweden. 
But more interesting is the fall in returns within 
Germany and Poland. The reduction in 
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returns in Poland is small enough to be considered 
negligible, registering at 0.2%, but Germany’s change 
was only about 10% less than the United States – just 
in the opposite direction.
V. Findings & Implications
 The results of my model do not support my 
hypothesis. They suggest that the re-turns to educa-
tion rose in three countries, but fell in both Ger-
many and Poland. This is unexpected, considering I 
hypothesized that returns would rise in all countries, 
but some of this may be explainable if we consider 
the particular circumstances in each of these coun-
tries. Subsection A of this section explores three 
potential explanations for these unexpected results.
A. Possible Explanations for Unexpected Findings
 The first is that I may have been wrong to 
consider Poland’s data representative. Subsection A 
of Section IV noted that the sample size in Poland 
was relatively miniscule and that data from over 
60% of respondents were excluded in this analysis. 
Further, the measures of average income in Poland 
were surprisingly different from one period to the 
next. All of this might signal that these data were not 
as reliable as I took them to be when conducting my 
analysis. Similar explanations could be extended to 
Germany in that the ISSP data provided informa-
tion on East and West Germany individually; in my 
analysis I combined these two measures, which may 
have affected the sanctity of the data. Additionally, 
both coefficients attached to Germany in 2002 were 
insignificant. This might also suggest flaws in those 
data.
 A second consideration is the handling of the 
global financial crisis. We dis-cussed in Section IV 
how Poland responded to economic depression.  Po-
land’s short-term work schemes were based largely 
off of those implemented in Germany – a country 
that also fared well throughout the crisis. As men-
tioned earlier, these short-term work schemes ef-
fectively limit the number of employees an employer 
can fire, instead causing employers to cut employee 
work hours or salaries. This (1) would have a nota-
bly different effect on income inequality than would 
individuals losing their jobs altogether and (2) could 
directly affect the returns to education.
 In the first case, inequality would increase 
as unemployment rises – when some individuals 
lose their jobs – or as individuals exit the labor force 
entirely. But these short-term work schemes limit 
the growth in unemployment and thus decrease the 
ac-companying growth in income inequality. It is 
likely that average income would suffer from these 
actions, but inequality would not fall. And since our 
hypothesis is based on the assumption – presented 
through the Paradox of Progress – that inequality is 
increasing as educational attainment increases, the 
falling returns to education might not be counter to 
the concepts upon which I constructed my hypoth-
esis; instead, my assump-tions may have simply been 
incorrect. With regards to the second possibility, 
that these short-term work schemes might directly 
affect the returns to education, returns might fall, in 
part, because employers could not fire employees. To 
maintain all of their workers, employers would be 
forced to reduce employees’ salaries. In this case, the 
reduction in incomes would cause the dollar-value 
of education to fall. The effects of laying workers off 
would likely serve to increase the returns to educa-
tion, because employers might be more inclined to 
retain more-educated employees; so, by reducing the 
growth in unem-ployment, Germany and Poland 
might have induced a reduction in the returns to 
education.
 A final possible explanation for these un-
predicted changes relates to the increases in average 
education. Over this ten year period, individu-
als obtained, on average, 1.04 and 1.70 years more 
education in Germany and Poland, respectively.  
Slovenia – the country with the next-highest degree 
of change – saw an increase in average schooling of 
only 0.66. Such a large rise in education in this time 
period might cause employers to value education 
less, since it would be so much more commonplace. 
While each of these three potential explanations 
holds some weight, none of them is strong enough to 
discred-it my analysis.
B. Additional Findings
 Also interesting is that there was no consis-
tent pattern relating a country’s level of development 
to changes in the returns to education within it. The 
United States, Sweden and Germany experienced 
radically different changes. The US’s returns grew by 
the largest margins while Germany’s fell by a similar
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degree. While Sweden’s returns to education rose 
like the United States’, it did so at less than a sixth the 
magnitude. Slovenia’s and Poland’s changes were also 
not particularly comparable, as Slovenia’s returns 
grew notably while Poland’s fell minimally. This 
supports Bourgignon, Ferreira, and Lustig’s (2005) 
dismissal of economic development as a signal of 
educational relevance – first discussed in Subsection 
A of Section II.
C. Recommendations
 These findings suggest that education is most 
valuable in the United States. But it would be hasty 
to recommend that other countries tailor their edu-
cational systems to more closely resemble the United 
States’, as these findings do not shed light into why 
the returns to education change. Just as they might 
suggest that a United States education is more valu-
able than a German education, these results might 
simply reflect that education is considered more 
valuable within the US labor market than in Germa-
ny’s. This is a primary avenue for further research: 
what are the causes for changes in the returns to 
ed-ucation? Exploration of both (1) the value placed 
on education in different labor markets and (2) the 
degree to which different educational systems actu-
ally improve human capital would shed light into 
this question.
 Further, these results suggest that levels of 
development do not impact the returns to education. 
But, these countries are all fairly developed. Consid-
eration of a broader range of countries would help 
our understanding of how education is valued in 
different types of labor markets. Specifically, greater 
focus on the returns to education within the lesser-
developed world could show whether these returns 
are significantly different when larger differences in 
development are present.
 But my largest recommendation for future 
research is that the Paradox of Progress not be as-
sumed to be true. Subsection A of this section pre-
sented the possibility that income inequality actually 
fell within Germany and Poland, which would sug-
gest that the results of Model 2 actually comply with 
the theory and findings expressed in Section II and 
that the assumptions on which my hypothesis were 
based – rather than my explanations for changes in 
the returns to education – were flawed.
 My findings alone do not yield policy rec-
ommendations, but the research I suggest might. 
With an understanding of which education systems 
are most effective at developing human capital, we 
could suggest that certain systems be adopted while 
others be abandoned. With a better understanding 
of how different labor markets value education, we 
could recommend particular levels of education for 
individuals looking to join the labor force in certain 
markets. And with an understanding of education’s 
relationship to income inequality, we might better 
understand the ways in which education increases 
or decreases inequality or the means through which 
inequality affects the valuation of education in par-
ticular markets.
39The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIV
Wightman
References
Amable, B., & Ken, M. (2011). Unemployment in the 
OECD. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27(2), 
207-220.
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human Capital. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Blinder, A. S. (1973). Wage Discrimination: Reduced 
Form and Structural Estimates. The Journal of Hu-
man Resources, 8(4), 436-455.
Bliss, C. (2005). The Theory of Capital: A Personal 
Overview. In C. Bliss, A. J. Cohen, & G. C. Harcourt, 
Capital Theory Volume I (pp. xi-xvi). Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F. H., & Lustig, N. (2005). 
The Microeconomics of Income Distribution Dy-
namics in East Asia and Latin America. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Card, D. (1999). The Causal Effect of Education on 
Earnings. In D. Card, & O. Ashenfelter, Handbook of 
Labor Economics (Vol. 3, pp. 1801-1863).
Carter, J. K. (2007). After the Fall: Globalizing the 
Remnants of the Communist Bloc. Economic Letter: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1-8.
Chevalier, A., Harmon, C. P., Walker, I., & Zhu, Y. 
(2004). Does Education Raise Productivity, or Just 
Reflect it? Economic Journal, 114(499), F499-F517.
European Commission. (2014). 25 years after the fall 
of the iron curtain: The state of integration of East 
and West in the European Union. Brussels.
Gasparini, L., Marchionni, M., & Escudero, W. S. 
(2005). Characterization of Inequality Changes 
through Microeconomic Decompositions: The 
Case of Greater Buenos Aires. In F. Bourguignon, 
F. H. Ferreira, & N. Lustig, The Microeconomics of 
Income Distribution mics (pp. 47-82). New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Hlavac, M. (2014). oaxaca: Blinder-Oaxaca Decom-
position in R. Harvard Kennedy School, 1-19.
Jann, B. (2008). The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
for linear regression models. The Stata Journal, 8(4), 
453-479.
Klein, M. C. (2012, December 18). Don’t forget 
Poland. Retrieved from The Economist: http://www.
economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/12/learn-
ing-abroad
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic Growth and Income 
Inequality. The American Economic Review, 45(1), 
1-28.
Mischel, L., & Davis, A. (2015, September 16). 
Income Stagnation in 2014 Shows the Economy Is 
Not Working for Most Families. Retrieved from 
Economic Policy Institute: http://www.epi.org/blog/
income-stagnation-in-2014-shows-the-economy-is-
not-working-for-most-families/
Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-Female Wage Differentials 
in Urban Labor Markets. International Economic 
Review, 14(3), 693-709.
Pleitgen, F. (2010, June 29). How Poland became 
only EU nation to avoid recession. Retrieved from 
CNN: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/eu-
rope/06/29/poland.economy.recession/
Polachek, S. W. (2003). How the Human Capital 
Model Explains Why The Gender Wage Gap Nar-
rowed. State University of New York at Binghamton, 
1-43.
Rosen, S. (2008). human capital. Retrieved from The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: http://www.
dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_
H000100
St. Louis Fed. (n.d.). Real Median Household In-
come in the United States. Retrieved November 24, 
2015, from FRED Economic Data: https://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MEHOINUSA672N
Visser, J. (2006). Union Membership Statistics in 24 
Countries. Monthly Labor Review, 38-49.
World Development Indicators. (n.d.). Retrieved 
November 2, 2015, from The World Bank: http://
data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-develop-
ment-indicators
